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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 To most Americans, children, marriage, adoption, and secure em-
ployment are mundane conceptssimply a part of life. For Betty 
Doe, however, these concepts remain unattainable. Betty, a law-
abiding citizen, has been denied access to each of these American in-
stitutions. When her employer found out that she was getting mar-
ried, she was fired. When she and her spouse tried to adopt a child, 
the state assumed that they engaged in conjugal relations and ac-
cordingly denied the adoption. Upon her spouses death, intestate, 
Betty was disallowed access to her spouses estate. At first glance, 
Bettys scenario likely appears illogical, irrational, and illegal; how-
ever, if Betty Doe is a lesbian, these denials are commonplace and 
expected.  
 The United States Supreme Court has condoned restrictions on 
life activities for lesbians and gays. Recent years have witnessed a 
slowly developing trend away from affectional/sexual orientation dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, as a lesbian, Betty still faces many legal 
obstacles. 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D., Florida State University School of Law, 2000. 
898  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:897 
 
 Recently, Georgias 165-year-old statute proscribing consensual 
sodomy was stricken as a violation of the right to privacy under that 
states constitution.1 The six-to-one Georgia Supreme Court decision 
will work either to continue the trend away from affectional/sexual 
orientation discrimination or to reinforce the negative stereotyping of 
lesbians and gays that has led to and allowed legal discrimination. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick2 legal-
ized the stereotyping of gays and lesbians, making gay identity syn-
onymous with sodomy.3 Legislation banning sodomy has subse-
quently been interpreted to criminalize homosexuality altogether.4 
Under this stereotype, criminal culpability of lesbians and gays is 
presumed, regardless of an individuals actual conduct. 
 As a result, gay rights advocates applaud any invalidation of con-
sensual sodomy statutes, much to the chagrin of gay rights foes. 
However, decisions invalidating sodomy statutes have not come 
without a price to gay rights advocates. Gay opposition to sodomy 
statutes inadvertently reinforces negative stereotypes of gays as im-
moral sexual deviants and predators. Accordingly, gay rights advo-
cates pay a high social price for their stance. Despite these high 
costs, this comment argues that Powell is a step forward in the fight 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of affectional/sexual orienta-
tion.5 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998). 
 2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 3. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1726 (1993). 
 4. Anti-sodomy statutes are not the only types of laws used to harass and discrimi-
nate against lesbians and gays, but they are the most frequently cited authority for legal 
discrimination against the gay community. Other laws used to discriminate against gays 
and lesbians are loitering, lewd and lascivious behavior, and indecent exposure. See, e.g., 
Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, 341 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Ga. App. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff 
could not claim an invasion of privacy when store clerks surveyed his behavior from above 
a closed toilet stall based on suspicion of homosexual conduct). The California Supreme 
Court noted:  
[H]arassment is used against suspected homosexuals in parks, in areas 
contiguous to public restrooms, and in homosexual bars. If a [police] de-
coy operating in a park or restroom fails to obtain a solicitation, he may 
order the suspect to leave the area and threaten to arrest him if he re-
turns. Harassment is practiced by the smaller jurisdictions which have 
no interest in making arrests and are concerned only with getting the 
homosexual out of town.  
People v. Superior Court, 758 P.2d 1046, 1057 n.10 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Project, The Con-
senting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Admini-
stration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643, 718-19 (1966). 
 5. It is difficult to identify the correct term to use when discussing lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, and transgendered people as a class. The terms Lesbians and gays in this 
Comment are meant to include all people considered to be a part of the gay community, in-
cluding bisexuals and transgendered people. Also, this Comment will address what others 
call sexual preference or sexual orientation as affectional/sexual orientation. This is in 
response to the assumption that being lesbian or gay is necessarily being sexually active. 
Ones proclivities towards a member of the same gender is not dispositive of her sexual 
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 Part II of this Comment discusses the role Bowers v. Hardwick 
played in framing the debate and how, in light of the impact of Bow-
ers, the Powell decision is significant for gay civil rights. Part II looks 
at Bowers equation of gay identity with the act of sodomy.6 Even 
though sodomy is common sexual conduct for both gay and hetero-
sexual people, it has taken on the identity of conduct specific to gays 
and lesbians, reinforcing discriminatory measures against gays and 
lesbians in American jurisprudence.7 Part II further analyzes the ex-
tent to which gays and lesbians are legally precluded from enjoying a 
normal life by the stereotyping of sodomy as gayness. Part II demon-
strates that the Bowers bias underlies the denial of adoption rights, 
child custody rights, and marriage rights to gays and lesbians and 
accounts for the adverse employment consequences suffered by gays 
and lesbians. As a result, overturning consensual sodomy statutes, 
either by legislative repeal8 or judicial decision,9 undermines the 
weapon that has been utilized by the government to rationalize legal 
discrimination against lesbians and gays. 
 Part III analyzes the Powell decision and discusses how the Geor-
gia Supreme Court distinguished Powell from its 1996 decision in 
Christensen v. State.10 Just two years prior to Powell, Christensen 
                                                                                                                      
conduct, despite the assumption by the legal system under which gay identity is equated 
with the conduct of sodomy. One who is lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered is not nec-
essarily sexually active and may prefer to focus on the love felt for a particular kind of per-
son, not merely the sexual dynamics of a relationship. 
 6. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 7. This equation of status to conduct is not unique to gays and sodomy in the United 
States. The Japanese concentration camps in California resulted from this notion of status 
as conduct. Thus, the Court held that an inference of disloyalty was a legally permissible 
justification for imprisoning Japanese Americans and their descendants solely because of 
their national origin. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). Yet, as 
Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Bowers, status alone is not proscribable. See 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). The Robinson court found that status alone is not enough to convict 
someone without additional proof of illegal conduct. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (1962). 
The legal discrimination of homosexuality is illogical in light of the Robinson decision; it is 
status alone that disadvantages lesbians and gays and the Supreme Court clearly held 
that discriminating against someone due to their status is impermissible. 
 8. See, e.g., Act effective July 1976, ch. 71, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat.; Act effective Apr. 1, 
1973, ch. 497, § 1, 58 Del. Laws; Act effective July 1, 1977, Pub. L. No. 148, 1976 Ind. Acts; 
Act effective Sept. 1, 1979, ch. 95, § 2C:98-2, 1978 N.J. Laws; Act effective June 1, 1976, ch. 
43, 1976 W. Va. Acts. In 1961, every state had a statute prohibiting consensual sodomy; 
most covered both homosexual and heterosexual conduct. A majority of those states that 
repealed their sodomy statutes did so by adopting the Model Penal Code, which was 
drafted in the late 1950s by an influential institute of lawyers and law professors. The 
Model Penal Code proposed legalizing private, consensual, adult sexual behavior, including 
that of homosexuals. 
 9. See Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 
112 (Mont. 1997); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Com. v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 
47 (Pa. 1980); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996). 
 10. 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996). 
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had upheld the very same sodomy statute as a constitutional use of 
legislative power under both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
 Part IV weighs Powells implications for the future of affec-
tional/sexual orientation discrimination, arguing that a broad read-
ing of Powell undermines the U.S. Supreme Courts stance under 
Bowers towards the gay community and that the broad reading is 
thus preferable. Part IV also notes that only the facts can distinguish 
Powell from Christensen, because the Georgia Supreme Courts com-
position had not changed. Significantly, the primary difference be-
tween the two decisions is that the Christensen case involved homo-
sexual conduct, while the Powell decision involved heterosexual con-
duct. Part IV thus argues that this distinction may very well exhibit 
the Courts bias against the lesbian and gay community, a bias that 
could lead to the judicial advocacy of future legislation targeted at 
lesbian and gay sexual conduct.  
 This Comment finally discusses the ramifications of the Powell 
decision on a macro level, particularly focusing on the Romer v. Ev-
ans11 decision. In conclusion, this Comment argues that despite the 
possible setbacks of the decision, Powell provides constitutional 
analysis and logic valuable for furthering the goal of equality for gays 
and lesbians. 
II.   BOWERS: THE JUDICIAL BIRTH OF SODOMY-AS-GAY-IDENTITY 
It is not uncommon in the law for yesterdays dissent to be tomor-
rows majority opinion. 
Michael Bowers, former Georgia Attorney General12 
 In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick,13 
which proved to be devastating to gay rights in various realms be-
yond sexual intimacy.14 Bowers involved a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to section 16-2-2(a)of the Georgia Code, which states, [a] per-
                                                                                                                      
 11. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 12. Editorial, Peeking into Bedrooms, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 18, 1996, at A17. It 
was Michael Bowers, then Georgia State Attorney General, who prosecuted Michael 
Hardwick in the infamous 1986 case. The quote reproduced here is from Bowers argument 
on a free speech issue involving a school newspaper; however, it seems to have come true 
in the case of Powell, whose majority opinion is not unlike the dissent in Christensen. 
 Bowers stance on state regulation became well-known after his ardent litigation in the 
Hardwick case and the later withdrawal of an employment offer to a lesbian attorney for 
violating the law. Ironically, he later admitted to a 15-year adulterous affair, see Press 
Release from National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Former Georgia Attorney General Bow-
ers Admits to Adulterous Affair, available at <http://www.ngltf.org/news> (last visited June 
23, 2000), which also violates Georgia law, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (1998). 
 13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 14. Tracey Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773, 774 (1988). 
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son commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or sub-
mits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another.15 In reaction to having been arrested for 
sodomy, Michael Hardwick, a gay male, brought a civil action against 
Georgias attorney general, Michael Bowers, seeking an injunction 
prohibiting the enforcement of the section. Hardwick was joined by a 
heterosexual couple, Jane and John Doe, whom the district court 
deemed to lack standing since there was no real risk of the statute 
being enforced against them.16 The decision, therefore, suggests that 
only homosexuals engage in true sodomy. Jane and John Does denial 
of standing on this issue was the first step in legally identifying sod-
omy as gay conduct, despite the common practice of sodomy among 
heterosexuals.17 
 Moreover, the way the U.S. Supreme Court framed the issue fur-
ther fashioned sodomy as equivalent to gay conduct. In the majority 
opinion, Justice White stated the issue to be whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States 
that still make such conduct illegal . . . .18 Whites formulation of the 
issue constitutes a narrow legal identification of lesbians, gays, or bi-
sexuals with sodomy, narrowing gay identity to sexual acts that are 
not, in fact, exclusive to homosexuals.19 
                                                                                                                      
 15. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-2(a) (1998). Section 16-6-2 also states, a person convicted 
of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more 
than 20 years. See id. § 16-2-2(b). 
 16. John and Mary Doe alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity pro-
scribed by § 16-6-2 in the privacy of their home . . . and that they had been chilled and de-
terred from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwicks 
arrest. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. However, the District Court had found that neither 
Jane nor John Doe sustained, or were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury 
from the enforcement of the sodomy statute, since they were a heterosexual couple. They 
were subsequently dismissed for lack of standing and this determination was affirmed by 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 
(11th Cir. 1985). 
 In addition, before the Supreme Court, counsel for the State of Georgia testified during 
oral argument that the statute was only going to be enforced against homosexuals. See 
Bowers, 486 U.S. at 218 n.10 (Indeed, the Georgia Attorney General concedes that Geor-
gias statute would be unconstitutional if applied to a married couple.). 
 17. Even those who discriminate against gays based on sodomy statutes rarely dis-
pute the practice of sodomy in the heterosexual community. For instance, in an interview 
with Ted Coppel, former Army Captain Michael Gary pointed out that the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice is not homosexual-specific and that sodomy of or by male heterosexual 
soldiers happens on a daily basis. See Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 1993) 
(Ted Koppel moderating an exchange between Michael Gar, chair of the Service Academy 
Gay and Lesbian Alumni Association; Harik Carde, retired Navy Commander; and Larry 
Rivers, Executive Director of Veterans of Foreign Wars).  
 18. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 19. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, Hardwicks first legal team at-
tempted to frame the question as one involving his sexual orientation, attempting to draw 
attention away from the sexual act itself. See Halley, supra note 3, at 1744. 
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 The Court essentializes lesbians and gays into purely sexual be-
ings without regard to the gay culture and without regard to the love 
between gays that is not unlike heterosexual love.20 With the phras-
ing of this legal issue, lesbians and gays were labeled as the only 
people that criminally practice the conduct of sodomy, making it 
gay conduct. Under Bowers, [h]omosexual sodomy . . . not only be-
comes the totality of sodomy, it also becomes the totality of homo-
sexuality.21 The Bowers opinion, through persistent, implicit invo-
cations, unified the bad act of sodomy and gay identity.22 Courts 
and legislatures interpreted the negative answer to the issue in Bow-
ers to prohibit homosexuality altogether, despite the presence of a 
broad statute targeting sodomy without regard to the affec-
tional/sexual orientation of the participants.23 
 Janet Halley argues that, legally speaking, sodomy and homo-
sexual identity are identical . . . sodomy is to homosexual identity as 
burglary is to burglars.24 Halley supports the proposition by review-
ing federal court opinions that identify the proscription of sodomy as 
the criminalization of gayness.25 Consequently, courts disallow lesbi-
ans and gays heightened equal-protection scrutiny of discriminatory 
laws on the ground that sodomy is the behavior that defines the 
class of homosexuals.26 Additionally, there is the automatic labeling 
                                                                                                                      
 20. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 547-
50 (1992).  
 21. Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 543 (1992). 
 22. See Halley, supra note 3, at 1748. 
 23. For instance, the Alabama legislature banned funding for any school group that 
fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy and sexual misconduct 
laws. ALA. CODE § 16-1-28 (1995). This ban was based on Alabamas Attorney Generals 
opinion that the Alabama sodomy statute prohibiting oral/genital and genital/anal contact 
between any unmarried personsconstitutionally prohibit[ed] homosexuality. Halley, su-
pra note 3, at 1736. In 1997, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that sec-
tion 16-1-28 unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of viewpoint under the first 
amendment. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 24. Halley, supra note 3, at 1734.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See id. (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). There are 
generally two standards of review which courts will apply in determining whether particu-
lar state action violates the Federal Constitution under the Due Process Clause. The low-
est level of scrutiny is rational basis review, under which the government need only show 
that the legislation in question has a rational relationship to serving a legitimate state in-
terest. The most arduous standard of review is strict scrutiny, under which the legislation 
will only pass muster if it serves a compelling state interest in society and it is a necessary 
means for achieving that compelling end. Under equal protection doctrine, there is a third, 
intermediate standard of review, that of heightened scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is generally 
applied to protected classes (race, national origin) and heightened scrutiny is applied to 
quasi-suspect classes (gender). All others fall into the non-suspect class, which is the easi-
est standard for the states to satisfy. 
 Gays and lesbians have been often denied heightened or strict scrutiny, leading to the 
loss of jobs and children and a myriad of other social difficulties. In 1996, the Supreme 
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of gays and lesbians as criminals,27 which is useful in opposing the 
gay community in both civil and criminal cases. This concept of sod-
omy as gay identity is further bolstered in cases involving challenges 
to the disallowance of gays in the military, where specific sexual con-
duct is presumed to accompany lesbian or gay statusan assumption 
that is rarely challenged.28 As a result, Bowers has been consistently 
used to disadvantage gays and lesbians generally, apart from the 
narrow question of actual sexual conduct. 
 Courts have subsequently failed to distinguish between sodomy 
and gay identity. The conflation of sexual behavior and status has 
been utilized to perpetuate the legal detriment to lesbians and gays. 
The logic of Bowers condemns the normal participation of lesbians 
and gays in society. It justifies the denial of employment,29 child cus-
tody,30 adoption,31 marriage,32 and student activity funds.33 
                                                                                                                      
Court for the first time struck down legislation as discriminatory against lesbians and gays 
under rational relation review. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking 
down a state amendment because the motive of the legislation was pure animus). This 
sharply contrasts with Bowers. In Bowers, the two bases for the majoritys opinion were 
that homosexual sodomy has historically been banned in this nations history and that the 
law was legitimately based on morality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-96 
(1985). The validity of these bases are hotly contested, particularly the notion that homo-
sexual sodomy has been proscribed since the birth of the United States in the 18th century. 
See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the 
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1077 (1988) (noting that 
there are no ancient roots in proscribing only homosexual sodomy, as the Bowers majority 
claimed, since sodomy applied historically to married and unmarried participants, of the 
same and of different sexes). 
 27. See, e.g., In re R.E.W., 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996) (Carley, J., dissenting the denial 
of certiorari) (arguing that a gay fathers assumed sexual activity is illegal in Georgia, 
making him a criminal despite the lack of conviction or arrest for the alleged activity); see 
also Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999).  
 28. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994); Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. § 
41 app. A (1992). The Directive states, A statement by a Service member that he or she is 
a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, creates a rebuttable presumption that 
the Service member engages in homosexual acts or has a propensity or intent to do so. 32 
C.F.R. § 41 app. A. This presumption could be raised just by hand-holding in private or 
hanging out in a lesbian bar. Overcoming the presumption requires affirmative evidence 
other than testimony of the accused that she/he does not actually engage in homosexual 
activity. See 32 C.F.R. § 41 app. A; see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc) (finding that plaintiff had failed to rebut the presumption that, since he was a 
gay man, he engaged in homosexual acts). 
 29. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Padula, a lesbian had 
been denied employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation due to her homosexual-
ity. See id. at 102-03. The court relied on Bowers in holding that discrimination against 
lesbians and gays is legally condoned and refused to extend to the plaintiff the protection 
provided by the Constitution to suspect or quasi-suspect classes. See id. The court stated: 
It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states 
may constitutionally criminalize as deserving strict scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause. Id. at 103; see also Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (in-
volving discrimination against a lesbian whose offer for employment was revoked solely 
due to her affectional/sexual orientation). 
 30. In Florida, a court denied a lesbian custody of her child, choosing instead to en-
trust the child to the fatherwho had been convicted for killing his former wife. See Ward 
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III.   POWELL: SODOMY IN PERSPECTIVE 
 In Powell v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down the 
states sodomy statute as unconstitutional, citing both federal and 
state constitutional rights to privacy and acknowledging the fallacy 
of exclusive identification of sodomy with only gays and lesbians. 
A.   The Facts 
 Powell focused on the acts of Anthony San Juan Powell, a 29-year-
old male who had been married for four years.34 While his pregnant 
wife, Gloria Powell, was sleeping in the next room, Anthony ap-
proached his 17-year-old niece Quashana Roland, who was watching 
television on a couch.35 He began to massage her and unclothe her 
while Quashana kept silent due to fear.36 As Quashana covered her 
face and began to cry quietly, Anthony performed oral sex on her and 
then proceeded to have intercourse with her.37 He then performed 
oral sex on her again, cleaned her off with a paper towel, apologized, 
and then retired to bed with his wife.38 Powell believed that the sex-
ual acts, including the act of sodomy, were consensual since 
Quashana never said no.39 She complained to a family friend, and 
within hours she went to the hospital while her mother called the po-
                                                                                                                      
v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Weigand, 730 So. 2d at 581 (affirming 
a custody order, which denied a gay father custody solely due to his affectional/sexual ori-
entation); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (denying custody to lesbian 
mother because children would face teasing and ostracism); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 
N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (awarding custody to father because mother lived with her lesbian 
lover, which would cause social disapproval adversely affecting child).With regard to visi-
tation, in most states lesbian and gay parents may only visit their children outside the 
presence of the parents homosexual partner; the assumption is that lesbians and gays en-
gage in the homosexual conduct of sodomy, a criminal behavior. See In re R.E.W. 
472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996) (Carley, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 
1181, 1185 (Miss. 1990)). 
 31. In 1987, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was asked to give an opinion on 
whether a proposed statute which would prohibit lesbians and gays from adopting children 
was a violation of either the State or Federal Constitution. See In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987). The court found that the statute would be valid, its primary 
rationalization being that under Bowers homosexuals do not have the right to commit sod-
omy. See id. at 24. The court reasoned that because of Bowers, restrictions on adoption 
would be permissible. The underlying assumption is that status as lesbian or gay is enough 
to infer sexual conduct. See id. The court applied only minimal scrutinyrational relation-
ship reviewunder which the state was virtually guaranteed to meet its burden. See id. 
 32. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). 
 33. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). 
 34. See Appellees Brief at 1, Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (No. 
598A0755).  
 35. See id. at 2. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 2-3. 
 39. See id. at 3. 
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lice.40 Powell was charged with aggravated sodomy and sexual as-
sault, but the judge additionally instructed the jury that he could be 
convicted under the consensual sodomy statute, under which he was 
so held liable.41 It is the conviction of consensual sodomy that Powell 
appealed up to the Georgia Supreme Court. 
B.   Powells Holding 
 The Georgia Supreme Court declared Georgias sodomy statute 
unconstitutional as a violation of the State of Georgias right of pri-
vacy.42 Once the court affirmed the issues of the case that did not ne-
cessitate constitutional adjudication, it focused on the right to pri-
vacy as interpreted in the State of Georgia.43 The court proudly de-
clared that it was the first high court to develop the right to privacy 
in the nation44 in the 1905 case of Pavesich v. New England Life In-
surance Co.45 With Pavesich, Georgia first recognized the right of pri-
vacy, characterizing it as an ancient law with foundation in the in-
stincts of nature, derived from the Romans conception of justice and 
natural law.46 This grandiose language describing the history of 
Georgias privacy right resonated throughout the Powell opinion47 
and was not unlike Justice Sears dissenting opinion in Christensen 
two years earlier.48 The court favorably distinguished the privacy in-
terest protected by the Georgia Constitution (the right to be let 
alone)49 from that protected by the U.S. Constitution (encompassing 
only those matters deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradi-
tion or which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty).50 The 
Georgia court explained that the wider scope accorded in Georgia is 
grounded in Georgias general desire to grant citizens greater protec-
                                                                                                                      
 40. See id. 
 41. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 20 (Ga. 1998). 
 42. See id. at 26. 
 43. See id. at 21. The other constitutional challenge was whether the trial judge had 
discretion to introduce a lesser charge of a crime to a jury during jury instructions. The 
court decided in the States favor under the precedent of Stonaker v. State, 222 S.E.2d 354 
(Ga. 1976), which provided, The trial judge also may, of his own volition and in his discre-
tion, charge on a lesser crime of that included in the indictment or accusation, Stonaker, 
222 S.E.2d at 356. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21. 
 44. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21. 
 45. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1908); see also Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21 (citing Bodrey v. Cape, 172 
S.E.2d 643, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969), for the proposition that Pavesich made the Georgia 
Supreme Court a pioneer in the realm of the right of privacy.). 
 46. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69-70. 
 47. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21.  
 48. We are privileged to live in a State that, as one of the original thirteen colonies, 
was founded upon the most inspired fundamental, and essential constitutional principles 
in the history of civilization . . . [a]mong these protections is an absolute and immutable 
right of privacy. Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 191 (Ga. 1996) (Sears, J., dissent-
ing). 
 49. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22.  
 50. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)). 
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tion of their rights to autonomy than that granted by the U.S. Con-
stitution.51 
 The court recognized that there are indeed limits to the protection 
of this privacy right,52 but that unforced sexual behavior conducted 
in private between adults is protected under the standard ex-
pounded in Pavesich.53 The definition of privacy interests delineated 
in Pavesich extends to behavior between adults in private,54 where 
the behavior is recognized as a private matter by [a]ny person 
whose intellect is in a normal condition.55 Applying the standard to 
the facts of the Powell case, the court held that [w]e cannot think of 
any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more pri-
vate and more deserving of protection from governmental interfer-
ence than unforced, private, adult sexual activity.56 
 The State of Georgia had the burden of proving that the limitation 
served a compelling state interest; that is, the Court subjected the 
limitation to strict scrutiny.57 In order to satisfy this tough standard 
of scrutiny, Powell held that the State must first show that the in-
terests of the public generally . . . require such interference, and sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.58 
 The court decided that due to the existence of statutes that pro-
scribe nonconsensual sexual conduct, commercial sexual conduct, 
and public sexual conduct, the only type of conduct that is covered by 
section 16-2-2(a) is consensual, noncommercial, private sexual con-
duct by adults.59 This conduct, according to Chief Justice Benham, is 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See id. at 22. The Georgia Supreme Court also made this claim in the Christensen 
decision. See Christensen, 486 S.E.2d at 189. However, in 1996, this was not the rule of law 
regarding the behavior of sodomy. In Post v. Oklahoma, 717 P.2d 1151 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986), an Oklahoma appellate court found that a statute prohibiting consensual hetero-
sexual sodomy was unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution and the petition for 
certiorari was subsequently denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. This, of course, would have 
strongly suggested that the Court thought the case correctly decided. Thus, the prohibition 
of heterosexual, consensual sodomy is presumably not allowable under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. However the Christensen court upheld the consensual sodomy statute, even though it 
also applied to heterosexual conduct. See Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 190. 
 52. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 23. Behaviors not covered by the Georgia right to pri-
vacy are acts committed in a public place, acts committed in exchange for money, acts 
committed with persons legally incapable of consenting to sexual acts, and acts committed 
when the privacy right is waived or the contested material is a matter of public record. See 
id. 
 53. Id. at 24. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (quoting Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69). 
 56. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 25 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). 
 59. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24-25. The statutes listed by the Powell court that al-
ready address sex for money, nonconsensual sex, and sex with minors are sections 16-6-1, 
Georgia Code Annotated (1999) (rape), 16-6-2(a) (aggravated sodomy), 16-6-3 (statutory 
rape), 16-6-4 (child molestation and aggravated child molestation), 16-6-5 (enticing a child 
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beyond the bounds of government regulation.60 Therefore, there can 
be no public gain or benefit from such a statute, making individuals 
in Georgia unduly oppressed by its existence.61 
 Despite Powells insistence that few members of the bench and 
bar, much less the public as a whole, would be able to state under 
oath that within the privacy of their own residence they had not 
committed consensual sodomy,62 the court declared that it would not 
condone the sexual conduct proscribed in section 16-2-2(a).63 How-
ever, the court pledged adherence to its judicial duty to scrutinize 
legislative enactment when it is alleged to impinge upon the free-
doms and guarantees contained in the Georgia Bill of Rights and the 
U.S. Constitution.64 The court then looked to other states that judi-
cially invalidated their consensual sodomy statutes and held that 
social morality is not a compelling state interest.65 Consequently, 
without a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
had no choice but to strike down the sodomy statute. 
C.   Christensen Distinguished 
 When Christensen v. State66 was litigated in 1996, it was seen as 
an opportunity for gay rights advocates to secure judicial invalida-
tion of Georgias consensual sodomy statute. Christensen involved a 
criminal defendant alleged to have solicited sodomy from an under-
cover police officer at a public rest area off of an interstate highway 
in Georgia.67 The defendant was charged under two Georgia statutes, 
one prohibiting sodomy and the other the solicitation of sodomy.68 
However, the opportunity to invalidate the statute did not material-
ize. 
 Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the statute as consti-
tutional under both the Georgia and the U.S. Constitutions.69 Citing 
Blincoe v. State,70 the Christensen court proposed that where a case 
involves privacy interests in Georgia, the State need only show that 
                                                                                                                      
for immoral purposes), 16-6-5.1 (sexual assault of prisoners, the institutionalized and the 
patients of psychotherapists), 16-6-6 (bestiality), 16-6-7 (sexual assault of a dead human 
being), 16-6-8 (public indecency), 16-6-9 to -12 (prostitution, pimping, pandering), section 
16-6-16 (masturbation for hire), 16-6-22 (incest), and 16-6-22.2 (sexual battery and aggra-
vated sexual battery). See id. at 24. 
 60. Id. at 25. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Appellants Brief at 5-6, Powell (No. S98A0755). 
 63. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 25. 
 64. Id. at 25-26. 
 65. Id. at 26. 
 66. 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996). 
 67. See id. at 189. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 190. 
 70. 204 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. 1974).  
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the legislation has a reasonable relation to a legitimate state pur-
pose.71 The states interest in the protection of the moral welfare of 
the public justified criminalizing sodomy.72 
 The Powell court supposedly did not overrule Christensen, but 
rather distinguished it. Powell noted73 that the activity in Christen-
sen was public (since it was solicited at a traffic stop and not in a 
home) and that it was a matter of commercial sodomy (asking 
strangers for oral sex rather than familiar intimates).74 Nevertheless, 
it can be argued that Powell effectively overruled Christensen, since 
the Court invalidated section 16-2-2 altogether. It did not uphold the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to commercial or public 
sex. 
 IV.   POWELLS IMPLICATIONS 
 Although not ideal, Powell provides a new legal rationale and 
precedent that can be used to combat discrimination against gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals made legal by Bowers legal, historical, and 
logical fallacy. A broad reading of Powell provides a welcome tool for 
gay rights advocates to combat this legalized affectional/sexual orien-
tation discrimination. Not only is Georgia another state removed 
from the list of sodomy-statute states,75 it is the same state from 
                                                                                                                      
 71. Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Blincoe, 204 S.E.2d at 598). The court in 
Christensen stated, [The] state has the right to enact laws to promote the public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998).  
 74. See id.  
 75. Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas all have sodomy statutes that 
only apply to homosexuals. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997) (punishable as a 
misdemeanor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995) (punishable as a misdemeanor; does not 
cover cunnilingus, see State v. Crawford, 795 P.2d 401 (Kan. 1990)); MO. REV. STAT. § 
566.090 (1999) (punishable as a misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 
Supp. 2000) (punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 
(West 1994) (punishable as a misdemeanor). 
 States with sodomy statutes that apply to both heterosexuals and homosexuals include 
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
65(a)(3) (1994) (punishable as a misdemeanor); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 
1989) (punishable as a misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1999) (punishable as a misde-
meanor); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1997) (punishable by no less than five years imprison-
ment); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1986) (punishable by five years imprisonment 
and/or $2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (1990) (punishable by up to twenty years 
imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (1991) (punishable by up to fifteen years im-
prisonment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987) (punishable by up to one year im-
prisonment and/or $3000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1999) (punishable by 10 years im-
prisonment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1999) (punishable as a felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (punishable by five years imprisonment and/or $500); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1999) (punishable as a misdemeanor); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Michie 
1996) (punishable as a felony). Louisianas law has recently been challenged successfully in 
the Louisiana Court of Appeals. See Pamela Coyle, Court Strikes Down States Sodomy 
Law, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1. 
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which the federal monster that legalized discrimination against the 
gay community originated. 
A.   Powells Undermining of Bowers 
 Bowers was based on the premises that (1) homosexual sodomy is 
not essential for ordered liberty, and social morality is in fact a le-
gitimate use of the legislatures police power,76 and (2) homosexual 
conduct is not deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition, as 
exhibited by the fact that most states have sodomy statutes, some of 
which originated during colonial times.77 Powell undermined both of 
these premises. 
1.   Essential Link in the Bowers Rationale Challenged 
 The fact that the court in Powell overthrew the sodomy statute is 
significant in refuting Bowers premise that most of the States pro-
scribe sodomy, illegitimatizing prong two of the courts basis for the 
holding. Sodomy statutes are no longer prevalent in the United 
States, and Powell further decreases the strength of Justice Whites 
prevalence argument in the Bowers opinion. Powell continued the 
trend of states invalidating their consensual sodomy statutes. Since 
the Bowers decision, five states have invalidated their statutes, ei-
ther by legislative repeal or judicial order.78 Especially since the 
Bowers decision originated in Georgia, it is only rational for other 
states to look to Georgia as a model for constructing valid prohibi-
tions on consensual sodomy. When Georgia itself overthrew its sod-
omy law, it pulled the carpet out from under the Supreme Courts 
reasoning. After Powell, only eighteen states with sodomy proscrip-
tions remain,79 further undermining Justice Whites arguments 
based on the antiquity and prevalence of prohibitions against homo-
sexual sodomy. The modern trend of invalidating sodomy statutes, 
which continued with Powell, may lead to the termination of all sod-
omy statutes across the country. 
                                                                                                                      
 76. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
 77. See id. at 192. 
 78. Nevada, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, and Tennessee have all repealed or in-
validate their sodomy statutes since Bowers. See sources cited supra note 9. Since the Pow-
ell decision, a Louisiana court has struck down that states sodomy law, continuing the 
current trend among the states rejecting prohibition of sexual conduct between consenting 
adults. See Coyle, supra note 75, at A1. In addition, Puerto Ricos sodomy statute, which 
only applies to same-sex sodomy, is currently being challenged; the court has already con-
ferred standing to the plaintiffs. See Citing Chilling Effect of Puerto Ricos Sodomy  
Law, Judge Says ACLU Challenge Must Go Forward, <http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/ 
n030899c.html> (last modified Mar. 8, 1999).  
 79. See Coyle, supra note 75, at A1. 
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2.   Legitimization for Raising the Standard of Review 
 As described above, the Powell court applied the highest standard 
of review, that of strict scrutiny, when presented with a constitu-
tional challenge to section 16-2-2(a).80 This stands in sharp contrast 
to Bowers, which applied rational basis reviewthe lowest stan-
dard of review in Constitutional jurisprudence.81 It was this differ-
ence that led to opposite outcomes regarding the constitutionality of 
the same sodomy statute. 
 In Bowers, the Court refused to subject the sodomy statute to 
strict scrutiny,82 characterizing the issue as the plaintiffs request for 
the extension of a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in 
acts of consensual sodomy.83 The Court proclaimed that the right to 
privacy is limited to only those cases involving family, procreation, 
abortion, or marriage84quite unlike Powell, in which the Georgia 
Supreme Court recognized the existence of a fundamental right to 
be let alone.85 Contrary to the implication of Bowers, the right to 
privacy has not historically been limited to familial activities.86 The 
Powell court, for example, did not make this distinction between 
family rights and privacy rights under the Georgia Constitution.87 
 Without a fundamental right at stake, the Bowers court was free 
to require merely a rational relation between the state interest and 
the proscription of the behavior, a test that rarely produces a deci-
sion against the government.88 Accordingly, Georgias sodomy statute 
easily passed the test relying on social morality as a legitimate state 
interest. However, the idea that social morality is not a legitimate 
state interest is not foreign to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Not 
only has that justification been rejected in various other cases involv-
ing procreative activities,89 but it has even been rejected in cases in-
                                                                                                                      
 80. See Powell v. State, 501 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998). 
 81. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
 82. See id. at 191. For possible equal protection violations that affect fundamental 
rights, including the right to privacy, courts should apply strict scrutiny when analyzing 
the constitutionality of a state action. The Georgia Court in Powell did not make this dis-
tinction when determining whether the right to privacy under Georgia law had been vio-
lated. 
 83. Id. at 192. 
 84. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.  
 85. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22. 
 86. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (recognizing the right to 
have pornographic material in the home under both the First Amendment and the Four-
teenth Amendments right to privacy).  
 87. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22.  
 88. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
 89. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 697 (1977) (holding that a 
statute prohibiting minors from acquiring contraceptives violated the minors right to pri-
vacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (finding that the 14th amendment right to 
privacy includes a womans right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (holding a law that prohibited unmarried couples from having contraceptives vio-
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volving legislative proscriptions of heterosexual sodomy.90 It was 
therefore quite paradoxical for the Bowers court to claim that the 
privacy right was limited to family-related activities when it has 
previously protected rights such as the right to possess pornography 
in the home,91 the right to abortion,92 and the right to use contracep-
tion.93 Arguably, these are rights not necessarily associated with the 
promotion of family. 
 Prior to handing down the Bowers decision, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari for a heterosexual sodomy case, Post v. Oklahoma.94 
It could be inferred from the U.S. Supreme Courts denial of petition 
for certiorari in the case of Post that it is beyond the states reach to 
proscribe consensual sodomy between heterosexuals. The Oklahoma 
court had recognized that there is no rational relationship between 
the state interest and the proscribed activity sufficient to support the 
regulation of consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual acts between 
adults.95 The state interest in social morality was not substantial 
enough in the heterosexual context to pass constitutional muster. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the Supreme Court finds consen-
sual sodomy between adults neither worthy of judicial review nor 
within the legislatures reach.96 
 The only other justification for Bowers upholding proscriptions of 
homosexual consensual sodomy is that homosexual sodomy has been 
proscribed from the beginning of the nations history and that many 
states still proscribe it.97 However, as noted above, this basis for the 
Bowers opinion is thrown into question by the Powell decision.  
3.   Acknowledgement of Heterosexual Sodomy 
 In addition, Powell undermined Bowers by declining to follow 
Bowers in characterizing Georgias sodomy statute as strictly prohib-
iting homosexual sodomy. The high court of a State is usually best at 
determining the meanings of the laws of its own Stateand the Pow-
ell court declined to interpret Georgias consensual sodomy statute as 
applying only to homosexual sexual activity. Indeed, if the statute 
                                                                                                                      
lates their right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating 
a statute that forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (holding that a statute providing for sterilization of habitual 
criminals violated their rights under the 14th amendment). 
 90. See Post v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding it be-
yond the states reach to proscribe consensual sodomy between heterosexuals), cert. denied 
479 U.S. 890 (1986). 
 91. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).  
 92. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.  
 93. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.  
 94. See Post, 715 P.2d at 1107.  
 95. See id. at 1109. 
 96. See id.  
 97. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). 
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were only applicable to gays and lesbiansas the Bowers court con-
strued the statutethen Anthony Powell, a heterosexual male, 
would not have been convicted under section 16-2-2(a).  
 The refusal by the Powell court to classify sodomy as homosexual 
conduct undermined the notion that sodomy is only gay conduct. 
This outcome forces a direct confrontation with the myth that lesbian 
and gay identity is synonymous with sodomya myth which the 
Bowers fosters and which is at the core of homophobic sentiments. 
The Powell court, in rejecting this myth, chipped away at the founda-
tion of affectional/sexual orientation discrimination. This action may 
take on even greater significance because it comes from Georgiaa 
state that in fact once viewed sodomy as exclusively homosexual sex-
ual conduct.98 
4.   The Effects of Powell Under a Broad Reading 
 Powells declaration that proscribing consensual sodomy is uncon-
stitutional in Georgia invalidated what is the key determinant for 
discrimination of lesbians and gays in numerous contexts. Its rejec-
tion of the syllogism that gay identity equals sodomy is made signifi-
cant when one examines how this logic forms the core of other opin-
ions that have undermined gay civil rights. Thus, cases in Georgia, 
and possibly across the United States, can no longer rely on sodomy 
statutes to discriminate against lesbians and gays. This might have 
changed the outcome in the Georgia case of Shahar v. Bowers, for ex-
ample, in which Michael Bowers had withdrawn an employment of-
fer from a new attorney after finding out she would be having a 
commitment ceremony with her lesbian partner.99 He was able to ra-
tionalize his decision by claiming that it was inappropriate for an at-
torney who participates in criminal activity to execute the laws of the 
state, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld the reasonableness of the 
termination. Since the Powell decision, a similar case would require 
the reconsideration of Shahar. Now that gay conduct is not out-
lawed in Georgia via the sodomy statute, it cannot be assumed that 
being lesbian or gay is criminal. 
 Powell affects not only the employment context, but other areas as 
well, including child custody. A particularly vivid example of the sig-
nificance of invalidating sodomy statutes for gays and lesbians across 
the country is the Mississippi case of Weigand v. Houghton. In Wei-
gand, custody of a minor son was given to his mother, who lived with 
an abusive husband, the childs stepfather.100 The stepfather was a 
felon convicted of domestic violence who constantly engaged in physi-
                                                                                                                      
 98. See id. at 209-10 n.4 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 99. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
 100. See Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 583 (Miss. 1999). 
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cal intimidation of the child; in addition, he committed adultery on a 
regular basis to the knowledge of the child.101 The childs father was 
loving, according to the dissenting opinion, and lived in a stable, 
nonviolent home.102 Yet custody remained with the mother because 
the majority focused on the fathers supposed criminality due to his 
gay identity.103 The father was presumed guilty of a crime he was 
never accused ofeven though he lived in a state without a sodomy 
law.104 The court ignored the actual convictions of the stepfather for 
felony assault and theft, simple assault, public drunkenness and 
malice mischief, instead focusing on nonexistent, assumed criminal 
conduct by a father trying to save his child from an explosive, unsta-
ble atmosphere.105 
 In the absence of a sodomy statute in Weigand, the court would 
have had no reason to disallow the gay father custody of his minor 
son. This fact was recognized in the dissenting opinion in Weigand: 
it is unfortunate that David [the childs gay father] could not bring 
this case in California, where consensual oral copulation and sodomy 
behind closed doors are legal. If the case had been so brought, David 
would have avoided the unfortunate and unnecessary behavior of 
chancery court.106 Oddly, even though this decision took place after 
the Powell decision, the court seemed unaware of the recent decision 
in Georgia, which the dissent described as a model sodomy-
prohibiting state.107  
 Powell may still have the power to decriminalize gay and lesbian 
conduct in Mississippi and other states across the country by under-
mining the logic underpinning unjust decisions like Weigand. Since 
the Powell court created this threat to the Bowers logic, legislative 
                                                                                                                      
 101. See id. at 584. 
 102. See id. at 586. 
 103. Id. at 590 (McRae, J., dissenting). The chancellors opinion, which was upheld by 
the Mississippi Supreme Court, stated, 
The conscious of this Court is shocked by the audacity and brashness of an in-
dividual to come into court, openly and freely admit to engaging in felonious 
conduct on a regular basis and expect the court to find such conduct acceptable, 
particularly with regards to the custody of a minor child. 
Id. (McRae, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that not only does the statute apply to 
both homosexual and heterosexual conduct, but the court directly asked the father about 
his sexual activitiesand not the other parties. Id. at 591 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
 104. See id. at 586. 
 105. Even though the minors biological father was deemed to have the more stable 
home, the minors church attendance with his mother and promise from the mother that 
the incidents of intrafamily violence were isolated were enough to override the minors in-
terest in living with his nonviolent father, due to the fathers lack of moral fitness as a 
gay man. His morals were considered lacking due to his potential criminality if he were to 
live with his partner in Mississippi instead of California. See id. at 590 (McRae, J., dissent-
ing). 
 106. Id. at 591 (McRae, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 107. See id. at 593 (McRae, J., dissenting) (This is not Bowersunlike Georgia, in 
California . . . consensual sodomy amongst adults is legal.). 
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repeal is likely to continue the trend away from prohibitions of con-
sensual sodomy. 
 If the issue presents itself again to the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
seems probable that the Court will overrule such a statute. The 
prevalence and antiquity of sodomy statutes across the country are 
decreasing, to the point where the major basis for allowing police 
power to extend into the bedrooms of gays and lesbians will become 
unmerited. Indeed, ten states have prohibited any presumption by 
courts that child custody should be disallowed based on affec-
tional/sexual orientation.108 As the Weigand dissent noted, the repeal 
of sodomy statutes may further this trend towards the ideal custody 
situation, where parents are not penalized for their affectional/sexual 
orientation and the case is determined by concrete evidence of the 
childs current health and stability.109 This concept extends beyond 
custody cases. Powells eradication of Georgias sodomy statute, to-
gether with the repeal and invalidation of such statutes in other 
states, will force states to evaluate the material issues of their cases 
and not dwell on impertinent assumptions about the litigants sexual 
conduct. 
B.   A Narrow Reading of Powell: The Danger of Reinforcing 
Affectional/Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
 In addition to the importance of the Powell decision as a building 
block for equal treatment for lesbians and gays under the law, there 
are several negative implications of the decision. First, it is quite 
probable that had the facts in Powell been raised in a lesbian and gay 
context, the court would not have ruled as it did. Therefore, the court 
may very well uphold any future legislation proscribing homosexual 
behavior. Indeed, Georgian legislators have already begun planning 
for new legislation targeting homosexual sexual conduct. Signifi-
cantly, the court has already demonstrated its reluctance to allow 
lesbians and gays the same level of scrutiny for matters relating to 
Pavesich-based privacy rights.  
 The composition of the Georgia Supreme Court has not changed 
since 1995 when Christensen was handed down, meaning that the 
same Justices voted twice on the same issue (the validity of the sod-
omy statute), but produced two different rules. This section will ar-
gue that it was the heterosexual context of the Powell case that made 
the difference. In this light, Powell also has the effect of perpetuating 
the stereotype of lesbians and gays as sexual predators and child mo-
                                                                                                                      
 108. See Courtney R. Baggett in Sexual Orientation: Should It Affect Child Custody 
Rulings, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 189, 193 & n.28 (1992) (citing cases from Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, 
and New Mexico). 
 109. Weigand, at 592 (Miss. 1999). 
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lesters. Historically, this detrimental stereotype has politically and 
socially disadvantaged the legal rights of lesbians and gays in the 
United States and this decision, when taken together with the deci-
sion in Christensen, may only further reinforce the label of the gay 
community across the country as a threat to children. 
1.   The Problem of the Heterosexual Context 
 As noted above, Christensen upheld the constitutionality of Geor-
gias consensual sodomy statute only two years prior to Powell. The 
level of constitutional scrutiny applied was the determining factor. In 
Christensen, the court utilized the Blincoe standard that required 
only that proscribing consensual sodomy be rationally related to 
promoting a government interest.110 The Powell court was much more 
demanding, applying strict scrutiny to the statute to find that the 
statute was unduly oppressing individuals in Georgia.111 Both chal-
lenges were presumably facial challenges to the statute; however, the 
only logical explanation for the change in majority view is the differ-
ence in the facts of the two cases. 
 The composition of the two courts was the same in both cases.112 
The only dissenters in Christensen, Justices Hunstein and Sears, 
voted to invalidate the statute in both cases.113 Justice Carley also 
voted consistently in both casesto uphold the statute.114 Thus, four 
JusticesFletcher, Thompson, Hines, and Benhamchanged their 
votes, voting with the majorities in both Christensen and Powell.115 
What could have changed the minds of four judges in two years 
time? The only difference that could have led to this mass exodus 
from a supportive view of the consensual sodomy statute to a strong 
belief in the unconstitutionality of the same statute was that Chris-
tensen involved sodomy in the gay male context, while Powell in-
volved heterosexual sodomy. 
                                                                                                                      
 110. See Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996). 
 111. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998). 
 112. In both years the members of the court were Robert Benham (Chief Justice), 
Norman S. Fletcher, Leah J. Sears, Carol W. Hunstein, George H. Carley, Hugh P. Thomp-
son, and P. Harris Hines. See Supreme Court Overview, <http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/ 
Supreme/scbroch.htm> (visited Oct. 29, 2000). 
 113. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 19; Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 191, 199 (dissenting opin-
ions of Sears and Hunstein, JJ., respectively). Although Justice Sears found the conduct 
involved in Christensen personally offensive, see Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 192, she none-
theless believed the statute was an unconstitutional violation of privacy. See id. at 199. In-
terestingly, Justices Sears and Hunstein were the only women on the court. See Supreme 
Court Overview, supra note 112. 
 114. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 26 (Carley, J., dissenting); Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 
190. 
 115. In fact, Chief Justice Benham wrote the majority opinion in Powell. See Powell, 
510 S.E.2d at 19. Justice Thompson wrote the majority opinion in Christensen. See Chris-
tensen, 468 S.E.2d at 190. Justice Hines concurred in the judgment only; Justice Fletcher 
concurred specially. See id. 
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 The attorneys for the appellant in the Powell case suggested that 
the Court distinguish the Christensen opinion by characterizing the 
latter as holding only that it is constitutional in Georgia to forbid 
public sexual conduct and not private sexual conduct,116 and the court 
adopted their characterization.117 However, as the District Attorney 
for Gwinnett County pointed out, the situation in Powell was no 
more private than the situation in Christensen.118 In Powell, the sex-
ual acts took place in the common area of the apartment, uncon-
cealed on the couch and within earshot of the defendants wife and 
family friend in adjoining rooms.119 In fact, it can be argued that this 
situation was even more public than the Christensen situation, since 
in Christensen, although the defendant inquired in a public place 
about sodomy, he intended to carry out the request in the privacy of a 
motel room.120 Basically, in Christensen the solicitation of sodomy 
was public, but the act of sodomy was to be in private; while in Pow-
ell, the acts were merely semi-private, if not public. 
 Additionally, between the two fact situations of Christensen and 
Powell, it seems that in Powellwhere the sodomy involved was 
victimizing and nonconsensualthe statute should have been, as a 
matter of justice, more likely to pass constitutional muster, in order 
to uphold the defendants conviction. Consent was never at issue in 
the Christensen decision, while in Powell the defendant relied on a 
mistake in fact defense under section 16-3-5 of the Georgia code, 
arguing that although his minor niece may not have consented, he 
did not know this fact.121 In judging the constitutionality of a statute, 
with rape of a minor on one hand and sexual conduct between two 
consenting adults on the other, one would assume that the rape inci-
dent would weigh more heavily toward upholding a conviction. How-
ever, that was not the case. The only logical conclusion, then, is that 
the difference between the decisions resulted from the different affec-
tional/sexual orientations of the defendants. 
                                                                                                                      
 116. In Christensen, Justice Fletcher specially concurred, saying that privacy rights do 
not protect solicitation of explicit sexual acts from total strangers in public rest areas. 
Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 190. It is presumed to be the holding in Christensen since it was 
a plurality opinion. See Amicus Curiae Brief of LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, et. al. at 12, Powell (No. S98A0755) (quoting Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
(When a majority of an appellate court fails to agree on reasoning supporting its judg-
ment, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.). 
 117. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 25. 
 118. See Appellees Brief at 6, Powell (No. S98A0755). 
 119. Id. at 6-7. 
 120. After successfully soliciting sodomy from the undercover officer, Christensen 
agreed to the officers request of driving to a nearby motel to carry out the act when Chris-
tensen was pulled over and charged for sodomy and solicitation of sodomy. See Christen-
sen, 468 S.E.2d at 189. 
 121. See Appellees Brief at 5, Powell (No. S98A0755). 
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 What makes this a particular problem for the eradication of les-
bian and gay discrimination is that lawmakers in the Georgia House 
of Representatives and Senate have already declared their dedication 
to passing legislation to recriminalize lesbian and gay sexual con-
duct, thereby giving Georgia a new instrument to use towards the 
impairment of lesbian and gay civil rights. For instance, Senator Eric 
Johnson, a Republican from Savannah, Georgia, recently said in re-
action to the Powell decision, To the extent that peoples religious 
faith teaches that homosexuality is wrong, the state should support 
those beliefs.122 If such legislation is passed, there is no guarantee 
that the court would strike it down as unconstitutional, inasmuch as 
it has already shown its bias against gay petitioners in Christen-
sen.123 
 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Georgia Supreme 
Court is moving if not to the left, at least more toward the center.124 
If this is accurate, there is a strong chance that the court would also 
find a sodomy statute proscribing strictly homosexual sodomy to be 
unconstitutional. This present court issued other surprising opinions 
in its recent session, opinions that startled conservatives and re-
lieved liberal advocates.125 If the last court session is not just an an-
ecdotal example of a liberal attitude,126 there is a greater likelihood 
that the court will strike down legislation criminalizing homosexual 
behavior. 
2.   Perpetuation of the Sodomy-as-Gay-Identity Myth 
 Two of the actors in the Powell lawsuit were gay rights advo-
catesthe LAMBDA Legal Defense Fund and the ACLUwho as-
sisted in the criminal defense of Anthony Powell by submitting ami-
cus curiae briefs, which is representative of national lesbian and gay 
rights advocacy. In fact, these were the only unsolicited amicus 
curiae briefs in the case. The arguments used by the court to invali-
                                                                                                                      
 122. Editorials, ATLANTA J. & CONST., December 4, 1998, at A26.  
 123. This is only if the legislation is in the form of a bill. If the recriminalization of les-
bian and gay sexual conduct is by way of amendment to the constitution, then the Court 
would have no right to adjudicate the matter. 
 124. See Bill Rankin, Georgia Supreme Court A Shift in Philosophy, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., December 20, 1998, at A1. 
 125. See id. District Attorney Danny Porter is quoted as having said, Theyve made 
some pretty startling decisions, not only on sodomy but in death-penalty cases. I think 
what were seeing here is that the personal beliefs of the individual justices are overcoming 
the rule of law. Id. Others see the trend in a different light. Cobb County Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney Nancy Jordan remarked, It just goes to show there are a lot of strong per-
sonalities on that court and the justices in the minority are not afraid to defend their posi-
tions. Id. 
 126. The Court has made several decisions of some notoriety, including one requiring 
probable cause before police can pull over a vehicle and several reversing high-profile 
death penalty cases. See id. 
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date section 16-2-2(a) seemed to be directly derived from the briefs of 
LAMDBA and the ACLU. Only these briefs suggested raising the 
constitutional standard to strict scrutiny, requiring the State to dem-
onstrate a compelling interest in proscribing the particular behavior, 
from the rational relation standard that was used in Christensen.127 
Pro-gay and lesbian civil rights activists supplied the court with the 
needed legal arguments to defeat Christensen. 
 It is possible that this type of presence and active participation by 
gay right advocates in the Powell case will aggravate their cause. 
One might argue that it will further the perception that there is a 
unity between gay identity and the conduct of sodomy. It could also 
be argued that the gay community could only devote much time and 
patience to the cause of sodomy because it has a stake in the allow-
ance of this particular sexual conduct. However, even if the gay 
community seeks legalization of this conduct for reasons of personal 
pleasure, consensual sexual behavior of sodomy is not, after all, 
unique to the gay community. Thus, while there may be some per-
sonal interest on the part of gay right advocates in legalizing sodomy, 
it is more likely that other, concomitant factors are at work here.  
 Gay and lesbian rights advocates recognize that sodomy statutes 
provide a primary tool for defeating the legal rights of the gay com-
munity; it is this recognition that elicits their unequivocal support 
for invalidating these statutes. Gay rights advocates understand the 
negative implications of sodomy statutes for the gay community. 
They understand how lives are influenced and ruined by the inter-
pretation of these statutes as outlawing homosexuality altogether. 
Submitting an amicus curiae brief in Powell was a pragmatic ap-
proach in the fight for gay rights, not a normative one. Basically, the 
game was defined by the court, and gay rights advocates are just 
playing by the rules. 
3.   Powell as Reinforcing Negative Stereotypes of Lesbians and 
Gays to Their Political and Social Disadvantage 
 As discussed above, gay identity has been defined through sod-
omy. More detrimental, however, is the way in which some have as-
sociated gay identity with pedophilia and immoral sexual deviation 
from societal norms, as well as the overall corruption of children.128 A 
particularly vivid example of this is Anita Bryants crusade in 1980 
                                                                                                                      
 127. See Amicus Curiae Brief of LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund et. al. at 
13, Powell (No. S98A0755) (arguing that the state may not infringe on the right to privacy 
absent a compelling state interest.). It has long been settled that government action vio-
lating a fundamental right can be sustained only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest. See id.. 
 128. ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATIONS 
FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 87-88 (1977). 
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to overturn a city ordinance that disallowed discrimination based on 
affectional/sexual orientation.129 Her campaign, called Save Our 
Children, had as its basic premise that the moral development of 
children would be thwarted by any equal treatment of gays and les-
bians, and that these sexual predators could not be allowed to prey 
on innocent children.130 This was a successful campaign that led to 
the repealing of the ordinance by citizen referendum.131 This same 
fallacy underlies the inclusion in sexual predator notification laws of 
consensual homosexual conduct in the same category as child moles-
ters and rapists.132 These justifications for discrimination ring in the 
ears of concerned parents and help fuel the fire towards anti-gay 
measures. 
 This negative stereotype of lesbians and gays as immoral sodo-
mites is perpetuated by the fact that charges against child molesters 
and nonconsensual sexual predators often include sodomy.133 The 
anti-gay argument presumes that overturning consensual sodomy 
laws would allow gays to molest children legally. For example, Steve 
Schwalm of the Family Research Council in Washington stated in 
reaction to the Powell decision, [sodomy laws] protect children by 
preventing bizarre sex-education curricula and homosexual propa-
ganda in schools, and they prevent homosexual couples from acquir-
ing children on an equal basis with married couples.134 In Powell, 
Justice Carleys dissent also resounded the harms of invalidating 
the sodomy statute, including the risk of legalizing incest, fornica-
tion, or adultery,135 and characterized the Courts actions as simply 
anarchy.136 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Id. at 88. 
 130. Bryant asserted there was a threat in granting equal rights, in this context rights 
to acquire housing, claiming that equal treatment would, usurp [parents] rights and life-
long effort to raise spiritually sound God-fearing, heterosexual children and provide homo-
sexuals a green light to recruit and molest their kinds in schools, public bathrooms, and 
elsewhere, and force religious schools, churches and synagogues to hire individuals who 
partake in activities that they deem as unnatural and deviant. Id. at 88-91. 
 131. Id. at 88. 
 132. Massachusetts and California only recently removed homosexual behavior from 
their sexual-predator notification statutes. See States Ease Registration Laws That  
Swept Up Gays, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 26, 1997, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/ 
w112697c.html. 
 133. See King v. State, 458 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 1995) (convicting stepfather of sodomy and 
child molestation after forcing stepdaughters to perform fellatio on him); Simpson v. State, 
876 P.2d 690 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (convicting defendant of sodomy, rape, lewd molesta-
tion, and exhibition of pornography for continually sexually assaulting daughter for three 
years); Ray v. State, 389 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 1990) (convicting defendant of sodomy and child 
molestation); Gray v. State, 375 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1979) (convicting defendant of murder, 
child molestation, and sodomy). 
 134. Editorial, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 16, 1998, at A22. 
 135. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 30 (Ga. 1998) (Carley, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 29 (Carley, J., dissenting). 
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 As the Powell majority pointed out, this argument is fallacious be-
cause, among other reasons, child molestation is already proscribed 
in every state.137 Thus, consensual sodomy statutes are not the only 
means by which pedophiles can be punished, deterred, and rehabili-
tated under the law.138 Section 16-2-2, moreover, includes provisions 
prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy, as well as any manner of 
forced sexual relations. Therefore, ridding states of consensual sod-
omy statutes would not lead to legally condoned child molestation. 
Despite this fact, however, the fact that many cases involving child 
molestation also include charges of sodomy has led the two to become 
synonymous in the minds of many traveling in certain politically ad-
vantaged circles.139 
 The stereotypical nature of the link between sodomy and child mo-
lestation was recognized by the Powell majority, which listed the 
statutes that already proscribed nonconsensual, commercial, and 
public sexual behavior and limited the invalidation of the sodomy 
statute to noncommercial, consensual behavior between adults.140 As 
such, the court undermines the notion that those who commit sod-
omy are all child molesters and sexual predators; otherwise, the 
court would have found the state to have a compelling interest to 
proscribe the behavior.  
 In this regard, Powell might be particularly helpful to the gay 
community in the area of adoption and child custody. Several courts 
have found that merely having lesbian or gay status involves not 
only sexual conduct, but harmful sexual conduct that could disrupt 
the moral and emotional development of a child. One court even 
found a mother openly holding her partners hand to be a type of un-
natural behavior that children should not be exposed to, suggesting 
that it might lure children into inappropriate behaviors that are not 
common to that of the parent-child relationship.141  
 However, basing child custody and adoption decisions on unsup-
ported assumptions that homosexuality is inherently immoral or 
dangerous is highly problematic; apart from sodomy statutes, there 
is no basis in the law for such assumptions. In this regard it is sig-
nificant that the constitutional challenge in Powell as well as Chris-
                                                                                                                      
 137. See id. at 24. 
 138. See id. 
 139. In Anita Bryants crusade to rid of a gay civil rights statute in Miami, she listed 
the following headlines to prove that all gays and lesbians are child molesters: Teacher Ac-
cused of Sex Acts with Boy Students, Police Find Sexually Abused Children, R.I. Sex Club 
Lured Juveniles with Gifts, OC Teacher Held on Sex Charges, Homosexuals Used Scout 
Troop, Teacher Faces Abuse Rap, Ex-Teachers Indicted for Lewd Acts with Boys, 4 Men Ac-
cused of Abusing Boys, Senate Shown Movie of Child Porn, and Former Scoutmaster Con-
victed of Homosexual Acts with Boys. See BRYANT, supra note 128 at 98.  
 140. Powell v. State, 501 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998). 
 141. See Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).  
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tensen was of the statute as written, not as applied in the particular 
case: Powell struck down the sodomy statute in toto, rendering it in-
applicable to homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. 
 This is so despite the defendants attempts, in his appellate brief, 
to distinguish his case by presenting cases dealing with homosexual 
sodomy; it is significant that he relied mainly on cases involving non-
consensual acts of pedophilia.142 Again, lesbians and gays are 
grouped with child molesters, which reinforces the idea that gays and 
lesbians are harmful to children. Of course, that is not to say that no 
lesbian or gay parents are ever guilty of molesting their children, 
but, generally, sex offenders who harm children are more frequently 
heterosexual than lesbian or gay.143 
 It is significant that the facts in Powell involved rape. Despite the 
unsavory facts of the Powell case, two gay rights advocates submitted 
amicus curiae briefs in support of Powell. Neither of their briefs 
dwelled on the facts of the case, but rather focused on the legal rami-
fications of allowing the sodomy statute to be upheld. The ACLUs 
brief went into great detail about the ramifications to gay and les-
bian civil rights if the validity of the statute were upheld. The brief 
also argued that if the court found that prohibiting heterosexual sod-
omy was unconstitutional, the court should not sustain the validity of 
the statute as applied to homosexual conduct, either.144 
 Supporting the overturning of sodomy convictions seems to pose a 
similar dilemma for gay and lesbian rights advocates, because it re-
inforces the idea of gay and lesbian identity as strictly sexual con-
duct. The same justification exists for the reinforcement of negative 
stereotypes of lesbians and gays as sexual predators, namely, that 
the rules are produced by the court and advocates have to play by 
these rules to overcome the statute. No perfect case will present itself 
for overturning sodomy statutes,145 and so the cases that do become 
available must be utilized to further gay rights. The ACLU and 
Lambda do not want people to be assaulted or raped without conse-
                                                                                                                      
 142. See Ray v. State, 389 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 1990) (male defendant convicted of solicita-
tion of sodomy of a fourteen year old boy not legally able to consent to sexual relations); See 
King v. State, 458 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 1995) (convicting defendant of child molestation and sod-
omy of his stepdaughters). 
 143. 95 percent of molestation of little girls is done by heterosexual men. URVASHI 
VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION 67 (An-
chor Books 1995). The vast majority of child molestation and sexual abuse is done by self-
identified heterosexual men, but this fact does not result in calls to bar all heterosexual 
men from becoming parents, teachers, Boy Scout troop leaders, or day care workers. Id. at 
324. 
 144. This is a valid concern, as the state of Oklahoma limited the constitutionality of 
sodomy statutes as applied to homosexual sexual conduct only. Section 21-886, Oklahoma 
Statutes, was limited to homosexual conduct by Post v. Oklahoma, 717 P.2d 1151 (1986), 
cert. denied 479 U.S. 890 (1986). 
 145. This argument is similar to that of Appellant. See Appellants Brief at 6, Powell v. 
State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 27 (Ga. 1998) (No. S98A0755). 
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quence of the law, but they do not want people to be convicted under 
discriminatory legislation. It is this focus on the law as an unconsti-
tutional device for discrimination by the legal system that prevails in 
the difficult representation of defendants like Anthony Powell, whose 
behavior poses the risk of distracting larger issues at stake in litiga-
tion and reinforcing negative stereotypes. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 As explained above, there are possible negative ramifications of 
the Powell decision, including the reinforcement of gay identity with 
sexual conduct, the reinforcement of the perception of lesbians and 
gays as sexual predators, and the possibility that the court might yet 
be confronted with a sodomy statute explicitly targeted to gays and 
lesbians. However, the Powell decision was ultimately a triumph for 
the lesbian and gay community. First and foremost, the decision un-
dermined the Bowers v. Hardwick decision, which was the bedrock 
for lesbian and gay discrimination across the United States. It de-
clared that majoritarian sexual morality is not a compelling state in-
terest and that this type of law is continuing to disappear, undermin-
ing the antiquity and prevalence rationale. 
 The implications of this decision are not difficult to delineate. 
Even the court was aware of its bold move, which would bring change 
and criticism to Georgian jurisprudence. Justice Sears was cognizant 
that people, upon hearing the Powell decision, would demonize some 
members of this Court for their legal analysis.146 Justice Sears 
seemed to be directly addressing the radical right when she said, 
[t]o allow the moral indignation of a majority (or, even worse, a loud 
and/or radical minority) to justify criminalizing private consensual 
conduct would be a strike against freedoms paid for and preserved by 
our forefathers.147 
 Language like this seems to say that the court is aware of the liv-
ing world around it. Sears stresses that the court is aware of those 
who seek to condemn a particular section of Georgias citizenry, al-
luding to the lesbian and gay community, and that sodomy laws are 
an exercise of this overbearing and discriminatory position. Justice 
Sears concurrence hailed the invalidation of section 16-2-2(a) as a 
victory for personal freedomthe freedom of the entire citizenry of 
Georgia, including those politically disadvantaged minority groups 
against whom the section was used to discriminate: lesbians and 
gays. Justice Sears opinion is a bold, certain, and positive nod to the 
gay and lesbian community; senseless discrimination via sexual con-
                                                                                                                      
 146. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 27 (Ga. 1998) (Sears, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. 
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duct statutes will no longer be tolerated by the Georgia Supreme 
Court. 
 This is a profound recognition by the concurrence. Powell arrived 
in the wake of the Romer decision and continues a move in the right 
directionaway from one of the last remaining legitimate means of 
discrimination. Under Romer, pure discrimination is not allowed
even under rational reviewand social morality has been invali-
dated as a legitimate state interest.148 Coupled with the Powell deci-
sion, the Supreme Court will have an arduous time should it try to 
uphold a statute similar to section 16-6-2 in the future. 
 Under the Romer decision, social majorities may not dictate to the 
politically underrepresented gay and lesbian community.149 Even in 
the absence of strict or heightened scrutiny, Romer taught that social 
morality alone is not enough to pass constitutional muster since it is 
social morality that precipitated the amendment in question.150  
 The two major bases for the Bowers decision were then further 
shattered by Powell. Powell decreased the list of states prohibiting 
consensual sodomy as well as declining to limit privacy rights to 
family rights. The next step will be for other states to look to Geor-
gia as a model and raise their level of scrutiny when analyzing the 
constitutionality of sodomy statutes.151 
 There are several costs of the Powell decision, the worst being the 
reinforcement of negative stereotypes of the lesbian and gay commu-
nity and the possibility that the Georgia court will uphold any future 
legislation targeting lesbian and gay consensual sexual conduct be-
tween adults. Ultimately, however, the Powell decision will prove to 
be a positive force in the conquering of affectional/sexual orientation 
discrimination in the law. Powell, coupled with Romer, makes a pow-
erful combination of anti-discriminatory precedent when dealing 
with the lesbian and gay community, opening the door to overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the precursor for incalculable affectional/sexual 
orientation discrimination. 
                                                                                                                      
 148. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). Romer was a constitutional chal-
lenge to Colorado Amendment II which nullified specific legal protections to lesbians and 
gays in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private educa-
tion, and employment. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the amendment in a 6-3 deci-
sion. See id. 
 149. See id. at 634 (If the constitutional conception of equal protection of the laws 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.) (quoting Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 150. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 151. Instead of being considered sort of the backwater of the nations appellate courts, 
it is now considered one of the leading supreme courts in the country. People now look to 
the Georgia Supreme Court for leadership, which has not always been so in the past. 
Rankin, supra note 124 (quoting Atlanta lawyer Jack Martin). 
